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Insurance As Interstate Commerce:
An Analysis of the Underwriters Case
ROBERT B. HIGHSAW*
The insurance business is now interstate commerce. It is
subject as such to the application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
of 1890. In a four to three decision, Justices Roberts and Reed
taking no part in the case, this is the judgment of the Supreme
Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Associa-
tion." The doctrine, enunciated as far back as 1869 in Paul v.
Virginia,2 that issuance of a policy of insurance is not an act in
commerce, is upset by a judgment which may lack effectiveness
both because of the narrow cleavage of opinion and pending legis-
lation to amend the Sherman and Clayton Acts 3 so as to remove
specifically insurance companies from the scope of anti-trust laws.
.I
In Paul v. Virginia the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Field declared:
"Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of com-
merce. The policies are simply contracts of indemnity against
loss by fire, entered into between the corporations and the as-
sured, for a consideration paid by the latter. These contracts
are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the
word. They are not subjects of trade and barter offered in the
market as something having an existence and value indepen-
dent of the parties to them. They are not commodities to be
shipped or forwarded from one state to another, and then put
up for sale. They are like other personal contracts between
parties which are completed by their signature and the trans-
* Assistant Professor of Government, Louisiana State University.
1. 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1082 (1944).
2. 75 U.S. 168, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1869).
3. 26 Stat. 209, as amended (1890); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2 (1941); 38 Stat. 730
(1914); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27 (1941).
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fer of the consideration. Such contracts are not interstate trans-
actions, though the parties may be domiciled in different states.
... They are, then, local transactions, and are governed by
the local law."'
This point of view was reiterated strongly in Hooper v. California
which flatly added that, "the business of insurance is not com-
merce."r5 Until the present case the Court has consistently up-
held this concept of insurance.6
It is noteworthy that each of the previous rulings on this
issue concerned the validity of state statutes regulating various
aspects of the insurance business. Not until the South-Eastern
Underwriters case was the Court asked to restrain the federal
government from regulating insurance by striking down an act
of Congress.7 Paul v. Virginia, as all other previous cases, stood
for the doctrine that the right of a foreign corporation to do busi-
ness in a state other than the one of its creation depended upon
the will of the state.8 This rested on the assumption that, while
a corporation was a person within the meaning of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not yet a citizen
entitled to full "privileges and immunities." The decision thus
gave the state the right to burden a business not yet regarded as
interstate commerce.'
There were good reasons for upholding state regulations of
insurance in the absence of detailed federal rules. In the first
place any harm which such statutes might cause could be re-
4. 75 U.S. 168, 183, 19 L.Ed. 357, 361 (1869).
5. 155 U.S. 648, 655, 15 S.Ct. 207, 210, 39 L.Ed. 297, 301 (1895).
6. Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. 410, 19 L.Ed. 972 (1871); Liverpool & London
Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. 566, 19 L.Ed. 1029 (1871); Fire
Association of Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 7 S.Ct. 108, 30 L.Ed.
342 (1886); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895);
Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367, 17 S.Ct. 110, 41 L.Ed. 472 (1896); Nutting v.
Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 22 S.Ct. 238, 46 L.Ed. 324 (1902); Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132,38 S.Ct. 444, 62 L.Ed. 1025 (1918);
Bothwell v. Buckbee-Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274, 48 S.Ct. 124, 72 L.Ed. 277 (1927);
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 S.Ct. 252, 80 L.Ed. 299 (1935).
7. 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1082 (1944).
8. Shenton, Interstate Commerce During the Silence of Congress (1918)
23 Dick. L. Rev. 78, 124.
9. This was in line with the interpretation the post Civil War Court gave
to the commerce clause, developing no doctrine which substantially altered
the principles previously enunciated: Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713,
18 L.Ed. 96 (1866); Waxing v. Mobile, 75 U.S. 110, 19 L.Ed. 342 (1869); Wood-
ruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123, 19 L.Ed. 382 (1869); Ex parte McNeil, 80 U.S. 236,
20 L.Ed. 624 (1872); Osborne v. Mobile, 83 U.S. 479, 21 L.Ed. 470 (1873); Chicago
and Northwestern Ry. v. Fuller, 84 U.S. 560, 21 L.Ed. 710 (1873).
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strained by other constitutional limits than the commerce power.
Due process, equal protection of the laws, and federal jurisdiction
over actions where the parties possess diverse citizenship af-
forded an ample judicial arsenal against possible abuses.
-Moreover, as the Paul case pointed out,' a contract is in-
tangible. It offers little difficulty in the location of a definite situs
even though the parties to it may be citizens of different states.
Once the state whose law controls has been determined, the
limitations already noted in state action would operate to give
sufficient protection to insurance companies. In short the com-
panies were protected by the federal government without invok-
ing the commerce power," but they were not regulated by it.
At the same time Pail v. Virginia undoubtedly placed an ob-
stacle in the way of that uniformity of legislation which students
of American government have recognized as desirable." In insur-
ance specifically there has existed a multiplicity of state rules
and regulations with regard to each of the aspects of the business
subject to regulation. An insurance company had to comply with
as many different sets of rules and regulations as there were states
in which it wished to do business. Some states were too lax and
were havens for fraudulent insurance companies. The general
effect of state regulation of insurance has been to cause the pay-
ment of higher rates. Financial statements and reports, the em-
ployment of lobbyists to influence passage of legislation, the pro-
curing of high-paid legal staffs to interpret it, and the mainte-
nance of numerous offices have all contributed to a higher cost
than would probably be necessary under a national system of
regulation.'3 Additionally the companies themselves have felt
burdened by local regulations and have raised the cry that theirs
is a business subject to the regulation of interstate commerce. 4
Indications from other sources have also appeared occasionally
that the rule of Paul v. Virginia was not wholly satisfactory.
James M. Beck, hardly a disinterested observer, refers to the
judgment as "easily one of the two most mischievous decisions
10. 75 U.S. 168, 19 LEd. 357 (1869).
11. Shenton, supra note 8, at 123.
12. See Graves, Uniform State Action (1934).
13. Graves, American State Government, 741.
14. An address on the regulation of insurance, by John F. Dryden,
President, Prudential Life Insurance Company of America, November 22, 1904,
pp. 12, 13; Huebner, Federal Supervision and Regulation of Insurance (1905)
26 Annals 681-707. Compare these citations with United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1168, n. 23, 88 L.Ed.
1082 (1944).
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the Supreme Court ever announced."' 5 This conclusion is based
on the argument that a foreign corporation seeking to do business
in an alien state places itself at the mercy of the latter state as a
concomitant of entering business there. States have, however,
been limited in their dealings with non-resident corporations by
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus a state must
grant a corporation "equal protection of the laws" once it has
entered the state in compliance with the laws of the locality.6
There have been judicial tokens, moreover, that contractual
relations which are essential to interstate commerce should be
brought within the definition of interstate commerce, this to in-
clude insurance. Such was the main import of Thames and Mersey
Marine Insurance Company v. United States. 7 There a corpora-
tion, engaging in the business of marine insurance, was taxed
under the War Revenue Act of 1898.18 This tax was assailed by
the company as being in substance a tax upon exportation and
hence invalid. Accepting this charge, the Court went on to say:
"Let it be assumed, as this Court has said, that the insur-
ance business, generically considered, is not commerce; that
the contract of insurance is a personal contract, an indemnity
against the happening of a contingent event. The inquiry still
remains whether policies of insurance against marine risks
during voyage to foreign ports are not so vitally connected
with exporting that the tax on such policies is essentially a
tax on the exportation itself .... It cannot be doubted that
insurance during the voyage is by virtue of the demands of
commerce an integral part of the exportation; the business of
the world is conducted upon this basis."' 9
Two years earlier, however, the New York Life Insurance
Company vainly sought a judgment that a state tax upon the
excess of premiums over losses and ordinary expenses incurred
15, Beck, Nullification by Indirection (1910) 23 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 450.
16. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 30 S.Ct. 287, 54 L.Ed. 536 (1910).
Accord: Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 47 S.Ct. 678, 71 L.Ed. 1165
(1927). In Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 42 S.Ct. 188, 66 L. Ed. 352
(1922) the Court held that as a condition of doing business within the state
a state may not compel waiver of resort on the corporation's part to federal
courts or withdraw the privilege of doing business within the state should
the corporation exercise such resort in protection of its rights against state
action.
17. 237 U.S. 19, 35 S.Ct. 496, 58 L.Ed. 821 (1915).
18. 30 Stat. 448 (1898), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1172 (1941).
19. Thames and Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 25,
26, 35 S.Ct. 496, 498, 499, 59 L.Ed. 821, 824 (1915).
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within the state was a burden upon interstate commerce.2 0 In an
exhaustive review of the subject the Court again found in a six
to two decision that insurance was not interstate commerce. The
Court, speaking through Justice McKenna, held that that tri-
bunal might decide differently had not the issue been "authori-
tatively" determined. He cited all precedents at hand and con-
cluded:
"for over forty-five years they have been the legal justification
for such [i.e., state] legislation. To reverse the cases, there-
fore, would require us to promulgate a new rule of constitu-
tional inhibitions upon the states, and which would compel a
change of their policy and a readjustment of their laws. Such
result necessarily urges against a change of decision.
21
The point of reference in this case, though, was still the validity
of state enactments. As we turn to United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association, the question of the power of the federal
government to regulate insurance as a part of interstate com-
merce appears for the first time.
The South-Eastern Underwriters Association, its membership
of two hundred private stock fire insurance companies, and twen-
ty-seven individuals were indicted by the United States for con-
spiracy to restrain trade in violation of Section One of the Sher-
man Act by fixing and maintaining arbitrary and non-competitive
premium rates on fire and specified allied lines of insurance in
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Virginia. The second conspiracy charged in the indictment, in
violation of Section Two of the Sherman Act, was to monopolize
trade and commerce in the same lines of insurance in and among
the states listed above.22 The indictment alleged that ninety per
cent of the fire insurance and allied lines sold by stock companies
20. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 503-504,
34 S.Ct. 167, 169-170, 58 L.Ed. 332, 335-336 (1913).
21. 231 U.S. 495, 502, 34 S.Ct. 168, 169, 58 L.Ed. 332, 335.
22. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S.
533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1082 (1944). The relevant provisions of the Sherman
Act are as follows: "Section One. Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
... Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such
combination or conspiracy declared by Sections One to Seven of this title to
be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Section Two. Every
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within the six states was controlled by member companies of the
association. It was further alleged that through continuous agree-
ment and joint action the Underwriters Association fixed pre-
mium rates and agents' commissions, boycotted non-members in
order to compel such companies to join the conspiracy, used
various means of coercion to compel people needing insurance to
purchase only from the South-Eastern Underwriters Association
on its own terms, punished independent sales agents by with-
drawal of the right to represent member companies if they also
represented non-member companies, and committed other acts
alleged to be in violation of the statute.23 These activities consti-
tuted "a single continuous chain of events," which necessarily
crossed state lines in the consummation of transactions.
From this statement the Court derived two main issues:
First, do fire insurance transactions crossing state lines constitute
interstate commerce within the scope of the constitutional pro-
visions? And second, was the Sherman Act intended to prohibit
conduct of insurance companies in monopolizing interstate in-
surance trade? Since the sole constitutional basis of the Sherman
Act is the commerce power, we shall necessarily consider the
Court's analysis of the first of these questions at this point.
On the basis of the facts of the case the district court had
sustained a demurrer of the defendants that they were not sub-
ject to the Sherman Act because "the business of fire insurance
is not interstate commerce." 24 The lower court went further in its
holding, ruling that insurance is not commerce-either intrastate
or interstate. The majority opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Black
reverses this judgment with a frontal assault on its judicial cor-
nerstone, Paul v. Virginia. Chief Justice Stone and Justices Frank-
furter and Jackson dissented. Roberts and Reed took no part in
the case.
Seven years ago the then Chief Justice Hughes declared in
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Com-
pany25 that:
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor." Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209 as amended (1890),
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2 1(1941).
23. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S.
533, 535, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1164-1165, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1084 (1944).
24. 322 U.S. 533, 537, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1163-1164, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1085.
25. 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937).
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"When industries organize themselves on a national scale,
making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant
factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their
industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into
which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect
interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of in-
dustrial warfare? .... And of what avail is it to protect the
facility of transportation, if interstate commerce is throttled
with respect to the commodities to be transported!"2
It seems evident that the Court is now asking the same questions
with regard to insurance companies, also organized on a national
basis, whose policies of investment and credit are interstate
equally with the labor relations of a large industrial corporation.
Can this test be fairly applied to insurance companies?
A glance at the principles of the Labor Board case is first
necessary. 27 The judgment of this case sustained the so-called
Wagner Labor Act, 28 which provided for federal regulation and
protection of labor organizations in industries affecting interstate
commerce. When it summarized the extent of operations of Jones
& Laughlin, the Labor Board found that the central manufacturing
plants "might be likened to the heart of a self-contained, highly
integrated body. They draw in the raw materials from Michigan,
Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania . . . they transform the
materials and then pump them out to all parts of the nation
.. . ."2, In fact, therefore, the steel company was engaged in inter-
state commerce and subject to federal regulations to prevent the
burdening of such commerce.
The decision in the case of the National Labor Relations
Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Comnpany"° perhaps
gives the best illustration of the expansion of the commerce pow-
er under the Wagner Act. The clothing company was not a large
interstate corporation whose business had any great effect upon
26. 301 U.S. 1, 41-42, 57 S.Ct. 615, 626-627, 81 L.Ed. 893, 914-915.
27. Four other decisions the same day, April 12, 1937, sustained the board
in various actions: Accord: National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 S.Ct. 642, 81 L.Ed. 918 (1937); National Labor
Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 57 S.Ct.
645, 81 L.Ed. 921 (1937); Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,
301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937); Washington, V. & M. Coach Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 57 S.Ct. 648, 81 L.Ed. 962
(1937).
28. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 151 (1935).
29. 301 U.S. 1, 27, 57 S.Ct. 615, 619, 81 L.Ed. 893, 906 (1937).
S0. 301 U.S. 58, 57 S.Ct. 645, 81 L.Ed. 921 (1937).
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commerce. Out of 150,000 men engaged in the industry, it em-
ployed somewhat less than 800. The Court sustained the applica-
tion of the statute, Hughes apparently relying on his statement
in an earlier case that:
"Although activities may be intrastate in character when sep-
arately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and ob-
structions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise
that control." 31
Although Hughes cited the Schechter Poultry Corporation case"
in support of this proposition, the general import of the Labor
Board cases appears to be that the doctrine of "direct and indi-
pect" affectation of commerce as a test of the validity of congres-
sional action is abandoned" and that any practice substantially
affecting interstate commerce either in a primary or secondary
sense is brought within the scope of power of the federal govern-
ment.
Similarly this seems to be the gist of the Court's opinion in
the case of Polish National Alliance of the United States of North
America v. National Labor Relations Board.84 On the same day
the Underwriters Association case was decided, the Court held
that the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits unfair
labor practices on the part of employers, applied to an insurance
company active in twenty-six states. Stated Frankfurter for the
Court:
"This summary of the activities of the Alliance and of the
methods and facilities for their pursuit amply shows the web
of money-making transactions woven across many State lines.
An effective strike against such a business enterprise, cen-
tered in Chicago but radiating from it all over the country,
would as a practical matter certainly burden and obstruct the
means of transmission and communication across these state
lines. . . . To hold that Congress could not deem the activities
here in question to affect what men of practical affairs call
commerce, and to deem them related to such commerce mere-
31. 301 U.S. 1, 37-38, 57 S.Ct. 615, 624, 81 L.Ed.' 893, 901.
32. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79
L.Ed. 1570 (1935).
33. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law (1942) 205.
34. 64 S.Ct. 1196, 88 L.Ed. 1117 (U.S. 1944).
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ly by gossamer threads and not by solid ties, would be to dis-
respect the judgment that is open to men who have the con-
stitutional power and responsibility to legislate for the .Na-
tion."3 5
In concurrence Black simply declared that "I agree that the busi-
ness of insurance is commerce subject to federal regulation as
such when conducted across state lines .... 31
The activities of the members of the South-Eastern Under-
writers Association, considered in this broad sense not merely as.
the entering into of a series of insurance contracts but rather as
the conduct of an industry, presented to the Court a picture of
an integrated enterprise which constituted a "continuous stream
of intercourse" among the states. Every insurance policy concerns
at least the transmission of money to the company, and the re-
turn of a policy to the customer, either of which may involve the
crossing of state lines. More significant than this, the risks which
an insurance company assumes, the investments it makes in
bonds and securities, and the premiums which it charges for its
services are interstate in character.
This was especially so with the Underwriters Association.
Only eighteen of the two hundred companies comprising the
membership maintained home offices in the six states covered by
the association.- T Agents of the company collected $488,000,000 in
the six states during the years 1931-41 and disbursed $215,000,000
in losses. 8 All this involved countless transmissions over and
across state borders. Clearly enough, the mere protection of the
facility of transportation would prove insufficient if interstate
commerce were burdened with respect to credit and investment
facilities.
Here, perhaps, appears a limitation inherent in the reasoning
of Paul v. Virginia. Concerned with the validity of a state statute
in 1868, the Court in that case examined only contracts of insur-
ance and ignored the insurance business which is the totality of
all policy contracts and companies.39 Once established as a doc-
35. 64 S.Ct. 1196, 1198, 1200, 88 L.Ed. 1117, 1119, 1121.
36. 64 S.Ct. 1196, 1201, 88 L.Ed. 1117, 1123.
37. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533,
542, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1168, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1087 (1944).
38. Ibid.
39. Tlmberg, Insurance and Interstate Commerce (1941) 50 Yale L. J.
959, 964.
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trine, the resultant emphasis on the contractual element alone
displayed remarkable tenacity despite the fact that insurance
companies and their activities are closely related to the national
economy as a functioning part thereof.40 This stress is reflected
in Chief Justice Stone's dissenting opinion which would permit
congressional regulation to extend to the formation and perform-
ance of insurance contracts only insofar as such contracts affected
communication and transportation in interstate commerce.4
1
Yet it must be emphasized again that in the Paul case Justice
Field stated a rule for judging state, not federal, action and that
at no time has the Court offered any elaborate explanation of its
exclusion of the, insurance business from interstate commerce.42
Justice Frankfurter offers the accommodating rule for this situa-
tion:
"Constitutional questions that look alike often are altogether
different and call for different answers because they bring into
play different provisions of the Constitution or different ex-
ertions of power under it. Thus, federal regulation does not
preclude state taxation and state taxation does not preclude
federal regulation.
43
A persistence of Field's rule has been partly at least a reflection
of the Court's inability to shift gears intellectually. Such a shift
is accomplished successfully, however, when Mr. Justice Black
denies that the Court
"is powerless to examine the entire transaction, of which that
[i.e., the insurance] contract is but a part, in order to deter-
mine whether there may be a chain of events which becomes
interstate commerce. . . . In short, a nationwide business is
not deprived of its interstate character merely because it is
built upon sales contracts which are local in nature. Were the
40. On December 31, 1937, twenty-six of the larger insurance companies
held 11.6% of the federal debt, 6% of the state debt, 17.4% of all railway
bonds, 18.2% of the public utility debt, and 28.5% of all mortgages rural and
urban. Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee (1940)
14718. From 1929-1938 some twenty-five companies received an income of
approximately $42,000,000,000 and invested $26,000,000,000, obviously not all
within one state. Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee (1940) 15493. The insurance industry represents no less than 64,000,000
policyholders as of 1940.
41. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S.
533, 568, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1181, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1102 (1944).
42. Timberg, supra note 39, at 966.
43. Polish National Alliance of North America v. National Labor Rela-
tion Board, 64 S.Ct. 1196, 1199, 88 L.Ed. 1117, 1121 (U.S. 1944).
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rule otherwise, few businesses could be said to engage in in-
terstate commerce."
The test thus has changed from a mechanical one to the review
of each case in an effort to accommodate competing state and
national demands.
Two points remain to be noted. First, the Underwriters
stressed the rule that insurance policies "are not commodities
to be shipped or forwarded from one state to another. 4 5 A con-
tract of insurance is not, however, solely a contract of indemni-
fication and dependent upon an uncertain contingency as to profit
or loss. The policyholder regards generally the contract as an in-
vestment on his part for cash surrender purposes and in turn is
contributing to any investment program the insurance company
may have.46 The parties to such a contract become, in a sense,
joint enterprisers in a network of commercial activities which
are certainly nationwide in scope and effect. Moreover, the re-
lationship of insurer and insured is not the same as occurs as the
result of the usual contractual process. A person buys insurance
much as he purchases a hat, an automobile, or a piano.4 7 This has
gone largely unnoticed.
In the face of these developments, the Court consistently as-
serted insurance was not commerce and let it go at that. Why?
Perhaps, first, because all the previous cases involved state regu-
latory actions rather than specific types of federal regulation. The
result was, as Mr. Justice Jackson states in dissent in the case at
hand, that, although the modem insurance business usually is in
fact interstate commerce, "In contemplation of the law ... insur-
44. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 538,
547, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1170, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1090 (1944).
45. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 183, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1868).
46. In dicta in Northwest Mutual Life Assur. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S.
132, 138, 38 S.Ct. 444, 62 L.Ed 1025 (1918), the court Intimated that the Invest-
ment business of insurance companies might involve interstate commerce.
Compare with McKenna's opinion in German Alliance Insurance Co. v.
Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 34 S.Ct. 612, 58 L.Ed. 1011 (1914).
47. One writer has put it this way: "The insurer deals in a standardized
type of contract, the terms of which it has fixed in advance. The main
objectives in view are to attract policy holders and at the same time afford
a maximum of protection for the insurer. The bargaining powers of the
respective parties are seldom equal. Furthermore, insurance is issued
through standardized methods involving the intervention of an authorized
agent who has no contracting power himself but who nevertheless contacts
the prospective policy holder and represents to him what the terms of the
contract will be. Thus, although insurance policies are still governed largely
by the law of contracts, they more nearly represent interests normally covered
by the law of sales of personal property. The public regards the 'buying' of
insurance much as it does the buying of an ordinary commodity." (Italics
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ance has acquired an established doctrinal status not based on
present day facts. '48
Second, the defendants to the present action contended that
control over insurance companies previously exercised by valid
state statutes would be placed in the federal government with
state rules becoming invalid.49 Jackson's dissenting opinion es-
pecially deals with this subject, though Stone's also touches upon
it.10 The majority opinion treats this argument lightly as one sus-
ceptible of exaggeration. The case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens
of the Port of Philadelphia5 ' upheld a state statute imposing a
pilotage fee on vessels entering the port. The opinion of the Court,
divided seven to two, found that, in matters not requiring uniform
treatment, state rules might stand until they conflicted with a
federal regulation.52 It is a familiar observation, furthermore, that
constitutional questions of apparent similarity have different con-
textual backgrounds which may call for varying exertions of
power.5 5 Again, the restraint urged frequently upon the Court
would indicate that no wholesale reversal of state laws is immi-
nent. In his dissenting opinion in an earlier case, Mr. Justice
Black argued that the Court should look for a congressional dec-
laration that a state law conflicts with federal power before de-
claring it invalid.5 4 There three dissenting justices insisted that
the judicial rule of presumption of validity of state legislative
enactments should be applied to commerce clause cases. Finally,
no state laws authorize insurance companies to use coercion, in-
timidation, and other dubious methods in the pursuit of busi-
ness,55 and most states require state supervision over agreements
supplied.) Malone, The Reformation of Writings under the Law of North,
Carolina (1937) 15 N.C.L. Rev. 155, 167.
48. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S.
533, 588, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1191, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1113 (1944).
49. 322 U.S. 533, 548, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1171, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1091.
50. 322 U.S. 533, 575, 583, 586, 591, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1185, 1189, 1190, 1193, 88
L.Ed. 1082, 1106, 1110, 1112, 1115.
51. 53 U.S. 229, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852). See also Swisher, Roger B. Taney
(1935) 406-407.
52. Thus state regulation of food and drugs was sustained despite the
passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act. See McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228
U.S. 115, 33 S.Ct. 431, 57 L.Ed. 754 (1913).
53. Compare Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67
L.Ed. 237 (1922) with Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 60 S.Ct. 907, 84
the latter state taxation.
54. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 60 S.Ct. 504,
80 L.Ed. 683 (1940).
55. "... it cannot be that any companies have acquired a vested right to
engage in such destructive business practices." Mr. Justice Black in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 562, 64 S.C .
1162, 1178, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1099 (1944).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
as to uniform rates. Moreover, general provision is usually made
by state constitutions or statutes in line with the Sherman Act,
prohibiting monopolies and restraints of trade.
Nevertheless it is against possible invalidation of state sta-
tutes that Jackson's dissent is directed. And this at a time when
the 'federal government has no insurance regulations upon the
books. Granting that the insurance business as a matter of fact is
usually interstate commerce, he argues that it has attained the
fictional status of an intrastate business. This it should be per-
mitted to retain until Congress alone changes the rule. He de-
clared:
"When, as in this problem, such practical judgments can be
made by the political branch of government, it is the part of
wisdom and self-restraint and good government for courts to
leave the initiative to Congress."56
His, then, is a plea for judicial restraint and acceptance of a
status quo pending legislative action. It is not an elaboration of
the old position that all insurance is not interstate commerce.
III
We come, now, to the second main issue of United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association: Was the Sherman Act
intended to prohibit monopolistic practices of insurance com-
panies in interstate trade?
Many familiar axioms of statutory interpretation may be ap-
plied to the reading of statutory intent, and were in this case.
Thus silence in an act, indicating awareness of a settled rule on
a given subject, may lead to the presumption that the subject
was not intended to be included within the scope of the legisla-
tion. Conversely, "equity of the statute" sometimes may be used
to bring the subject within statutory bounds. The result, then, of
efforts in many cases to discover statutory intent is inconclusive.
The performance of judicial law-making founded upon judicial
policy-making remains necessary.5 7 This was the case in the pres-
ent controversy.
56. 322 U.S. 533, 594, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1195, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1117.
57. This is of capital importance, for by marking out the area within
which government, both state and federal, may act, the Court at least
temporarily sways the cause of political action. Compare Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 15 S.Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759 (1895) with Brushaber
v. Union Pacific Ry., 240 U.S. 1, 18, 36 S.Ct. 236, 243, 60 L.Ed. 493, 510 (1916);
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529, 62 L.Ed. 1101 (1918) with
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In interpreting legislative intent as to applicability of the
Sherman Act, the Court deals not with a purely legal issue, but
with one which also involves a question of power and hence of
policy. No criteria of judgment are to be found in the Constitu-
tion on the policy of applying an anti-trust statute to interstate
businesses. The issue is one of what the Constitution should be-
come, and for resolution demands an appeal to conceptions of
statesmanship. 8 These appeals in turn involve a choice between
competing interests.5 9 The end result is that formulation of ju-
dicial theories of constitutional law contains a personal element.
6 0
The decision of the individual judge will follow from the synthe-
sis of his predilections and their effect upon his concept of desir-
able public policy.61
This becomes apparent in the Underwriters case. Neither
Black's opinion of the Court nor Stone's dissent is a simple ex-
pressiori of legal logistics, a mere amassing of the lawyer's "trans-
port and supply." Each starts from a major premise, based ulti-
mately upon the writer's own conception of policy, and each fol-
lows his reasoning through to its logical end. The arguments of
the two justices may be stated briefly to illustrate the point.
Thus Stone argues, in effect, that, when Congress passed the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, it was aware of the long settled rule
that insurance is not interstate commerce.6 2 Congress has refused
many times to declare affirmatively that insurance is interstate
commerce." The reasonable assumption is that Congress did not
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609
(1941). See also Corwin, Court Over Constitution (1939) c. IV; Corwin,
Constitutional Revolution, Lt'd (1937).
58. Powell, Essays on the Law and Practice of Government Administra-
tion (1935) 198.
59. Compare Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 112-114
with Kelsen, The Pure Theory of the Law (1935) 51 L. Q. Rev. 517, 528.
60. Haines, General Observation on the Effects of Personal, Political,
and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges (1922) 17 Ill. L. Rev.
96, 104.
61. Periodical literature upon the nature of the judicial process is
voluminous. Among others see Cardozo, loc. cit. supra note 59; Dickinson,
Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision (1931) 79 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 833; Frank, What Courts Do in Fact (1932) 26 Ill. L. Rev. 645;
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev.
431; Schroeder, The Psychological Study of Judicial Opinions (1918) 6 Calif.
L. Rev. 89.
62. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S.
*533, 569, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1182 and passim, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1103 (1944).
63. The following bills have been introduced in the Congress at various
times to "federalize" the insurance business: H.1. 738, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1866); Senate Bill 299, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868); H.R. 9629, 52d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1892); Senate Bill 2736, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. (1897); Senate Bill 7277,
58th Cong., 3d Sess. (1904); S.J. Res. 103, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); H.J. Res.
194, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); S.J. Res. 58, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1915). The
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intend the scope of the act to transcend constitutional. limitations.
Furthermore, congressional refusal to, enter the field of insurance
regulation, together with the long line of judicial decisions, com-
bined to encourage, perhaps hasten, the systematic development
of state regulations. 4 This is a cogent argument and, if deter-
minative of the issue, it would be highly persuasive.
Countervailing is the argument that the scope of the Sherman
Act was intended to be coextensive with the interstate commerce
power, and if the shifting concepts were later to be enlarged by
the court, Congress wished the scope of the act to follow the en-
largements; in other words, Congress wanted the scope of the
anti-trust legislation to be as broad as was constitutionally pos-
sible, then or thereafter. As Black puts it, "The question was not
whether they [trusts and monopolies] should be abolished, but
how this purpose could best be accomplished." 6
Each of these general theses is. in the best vein of judicial
balderdash. Choice between them is a matter of personal prefer-
ence. Justices Stone and Black each postulate an impressive num-
ber of arguments to establish intent. Argument is neatly bal-
anced as the following chart indicates:"6
BLACK STONE
1. The language of the Sher- 1. The Sherman Act does not
man Act is clear, comprehen- apply to interstate insurance
sive, and shows a studied at- because there has been no,restraint of ma rk e t ing of
tempt to include all interstate gosand serein iegoods and services in inter-
businesses, state commerce.
2. A general application of 2. Nothing in the legislative
the act is in harmony with the history of the act suggests it
spirit of the times which gave was intended to apply to the
rise to congressional action. interstate insurance business.
Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary also declined to recommend
legislation regulating insurance following President Theodore Roosevelt's
Message of 1905. H.R. Rep. 2491, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906); Sen. Rep. 4406,
59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906). Most of them proposed to establish a national
bureau of insurance with regulatory powers.
64. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 822 U.S.
533, 580, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1188, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1109 (1944).
65. 322 U.S. 533, 555, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1175, 88 L.Ed. 1082, 1095.
66. Black: 322 U.S. 533, 553-562, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1174-1178, 88 L.Ed. 1082,
1094-1099; Stone: 22 U.S. 533, 569-581, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1182-1188, 88 L.Ed. 1082,
110 3-1110.
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3. There is no unequivocal
expression of congressional
desire to exclude the insur-
ance business from applica-,
tion of the act.
4. If exceptions are to be
made in the application of the
act, Congress must make
them. The a r g u m en t that
many state laws are necessar-
ily invalidated by application
of federal anti-trust legisla-
tion is exaggerated.
3. Congress has consistently
declined invitations to consid-
er whether its power to regu-
late interstate commerce in-
cludes intrastate commerce.
4. The present decision of
the Court will destroy state
regulatory. statutes with re-
sultant confusion in the busi-
ness.
It is evident that Black started from the premise that appli-
cation of the Sherman Act to insurance businesses in interstate
commerce was desirable as a matter of policy; Stone started from
the converse premise. Both marshaled facts to support their posi-
tions, reasoned deductively from alternate choice of precedent,
and occasionally resorted to simple verbalism. More members of
the Court, three in fact, supported Black than Stone, who had
the concurrence of two justices. Black's proposition, therefore,
became the opinion of the Court.
IV
The effect of the decision in the Underwriters case upon the
actual conduct of interstate insurance remains problematical. 7
Any prediction is subjected necessarily to qualifications. Some
definite conclusions emerge clearly, however, in relation to the
everyday practices of the business.
Stock fire and casualty company executives view the results
of the judgment as twofold: First, a series of federal acts is made
applicable to interstate insurance which will be in conflict, it is
claimed, with the provisions of state laws. Second, state regula-
tory acts and the business are subjected to the line of decisions
interpreting the federal commerce power and regulatory statutes
enacted under it.6 8 To meet these alleged difficulties the Execu-
67. The writer acknowledges Indebtedness for much of the material used
in this section to representatives of the business. Especially helpful has been
Mr. Ray Murphy, General Counsel to the Association of Casualty and Surety
Executives.
68. Report of Sub-Committee on Federal Legislation to Executive Corn-
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tive Committee of the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners on August 29, 1944, recommended a declaration by Con-
gress that the regulation and taxation of insurance be continued
in the states; that the insurance business be completely elimin-
ated from the Federal Trade Commission and Robinson-Patman
Acts; 69 and that the industry be partially exempted from appli-
cation of the Sherman Act, the specific exemptions being de-
scribed as "all cooperative procedures necessary and incidental
to the establishment of a statistical rate base, rates, coverages,
and related matters."70 These recommendations touch at the very
center of the matter-trade practices and especially statistical
reporting.
Although unregulated competition prevailed in the early
days of the business, the states today have widely regulated in-
surance in order that rates be fair and reasonable.7 1 Therein the
Underwriters case has posed the dilemma confronting the busi-
ness. If unfair discrimination is to be avoided, rate uniformity
must prevail. Such uniformity results only by cooperation in
ferreting out statistical data and basing rates on conclusions
drawn therefrom. A concerted action on the part of the companies
is thus required. At the same time, there is a marked tendency
on the part of the courts to hold that statistical reporting leadIng
to agreements to fix prices is illegal.72
A cardinal principle of the fire and casualty fields of insur-
ance has been that cooperative activity of all companies writing
policies, is necessary in order to determine the loss experienced
as a basis for arriving at a fair and reasonable rate of premium
mittee of National Association of Insurance Commissioners (1944) 5. (Herein-
after cited as Report of. Sub-Committee.)
69. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 i(1941); 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15
U.S.C.A. § 13 (1941).
70. Memorandum prepared by Mr. John M. McFall, Vice President and
Chief Attorney of the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (1944) 1.
(Hereinafter cited as McFall, Memorandum.)
71. Memorandum of Association of Casualty and Surety Executives to
Sub-Committee on Federal Legislation, National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (1944) 3. (Hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Association
of Casualty and Surety Executives.)
72. On the subject of statistical reporting services and anti-trust legisla-
tion, see American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 42
S.Ct. 114, 66 L.Ed. 284 (1921); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262
U.S. 371, 43 S.Ct. 607, 67 L.Ed. 1035 (1923); Maple Flooring Manufacturers
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 45 S.Ct. 578, 69 L.Ed. 1093 (1925); Cement
Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 45 S.Ct. 586,
69 L.Ed. 1104 (1925); Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 56 S.Ct.
629, 80 L.Ed. 859 (1936). For a review of these cases, see also Kirsch, Trade
Associations in Law and Business (1938) 34-79.
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charges. Conditions in these fields differ from those prevailing
in life insurance. In the latter, gross rates may be based upon a
large number of readily available factors, such as mortality
tables.7a In fire and casualty insurance there is no assurance that
the insured contingency will occur. These types of policies are
largely, though not exclusively, of an indemnifying nature. The
obligation of the insurer becomes absolute only whenever a fire
or accident takes place. Necessarily, therefore, the wider the sta-
tistical base of information the more accurate can be rate deter-
mination. Combination of experience of the companies in the field
leaves such companies in a position to discharge fairly incurred
obligations.
Consequently, bureaus have been privately established by
the companies to pool their individual experiences and arrive at
a premium rate. In the casualty field many states have enacted
regulations permitting and occasionally requiring companies to
collect common statistical dataT4 An example is afforded by work-
man's compensation insurance. Here, though casualty companies
may combine to pool experience, the rates issued on the basis of
such experience are subject to approval of state supervisory of-
ficials. In the fire insurance field this practice has been almost
entirely private, and state regulatory power has been little ex-
ercised. In either event, the underlying purposes of statistical
reporting in insurance are on the fringe of conflict with the con-
cept of unrestricted competition in the Sherman Act. This does
not mean, however, that all statistical reporting is illegal. 75
The practical effect of the Court's decision in the Underwrit-
ers case is to give rise to the danger that all associations of in-
surance companies for rate-making or other purposes may fall be-
73. Report of Sub-Committee, supra note 68, at 10.
74. Ibid.
75. With qualifications, valid principles of statistical reporting have been
listed as follows:
(1) Secrecy in reporting data and limitation of information to members
of the trade association is illegal.
(2) Statistics must be compiled "fairly" and record "actual transactions."
(3) Reports must not be more detailed or specific than is necessary for
intelligent comprehension of fundamental industrial conditions.
(4) Representatives of the trade association may not make comments
"influencing" production or price policies of individual members.
(5) There must be no penal provision to force members to conform to
group action with respect to prices, etc.
(6) There must be no supervisory system which amounts to control of
members by the association.
(7) Except for "special circumstances," reports must be of "past trans-
actions," not "future prices."
Hirsch, op. cit. supra note 72, at 52-66.
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fore the anti-trust legislation. This would include associations for
standardized policy forms and uniform coverage, as well as other
kinds of agreements which may bear substantial relation to rate
structures. 76 Yet the very conditions of the interstate insurance
business make it necessary for the fire and casualty companies to
cooperate for these purposes. It is in the public interest that the
rates paid for insurance be based upon accurate information
rather than guesswork. Accordingly, the question arises: Is there
any way, following United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, by which such companies may provide a common
fund of factual data for the legitimate purposes of the business?
The separate dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Hardwood
case is suggestive on this point.7 The Court is perfectly capable
of recognizing that a purely competitive market condition in the
insurance business, as in others, can result only in ignorance,
fraud, coercion, and unintelligent conduct, harmful to the public
in the long run. At the very least, the South-Eastern Underwriters
case leaves open the probability of judicial recognition of the re-
quirements of the business. At most, it stands as a shot-gun pulled
from the closet to compel congressional action.
In addition, several legislative reforms might be effected.
First, it has been suggested that cooperative associations which
have been organized for experience purposes may be continued
if such procedure be required by the law of each state. In this
case the combinations, being involuntary, would not violate anti-
trust laws. However, it cannot be assumed with any assurance
76. Compare, however, with Kirsch, op. cit. supra note 72, at 135-163.
77. He stated: "The cooperation which Is incident to this plan does not
suppress competition. On the contrary It tends to promote all in competition
which is desirable. By substituting knowledge for ignorance, rumor, guess,
and suspicion, it tends also to substitute research and reasoning for gambling
and piracy, without closing the door to adventure or lessening the value of
prophetic wisdom .... If, as Is alleged, the Plan tends to substitute stability
in prices for violent fluctuations, its influence in this respect, is not against
the public Interest." American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377, 418, 42 S.Ct. 114, 123, 66 L.Ed. 284, 298 (1921). Compare with Holmes'
dissent, 257 U.S. 377, 412, 42 S.Ct. 114, 121, 66 L.Ed. 284, 296. See also Appala-
chian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S.Ct. 471, 77 L.Ed. 825 (1932).
In this case 137 producers of bituminous coal created the Appalachian Coals
Commission which, as a common selling agency, agreed to establish standard
classifications, obtain best prices, apportion orders, and fix the selling price.
Defendants alleged their motive was to increase sales through better ways
of advertising, research, marketing, and constructive trade practices. Held:
Appalachian Coals was not a restraint of interstate commerce in violation
of the Sherman Act. Apparently the Court will test "reasonableness" on the
basis of motives and effects of the plan, economic conditions peculiar to the
industry, reasons for adoption, and probable results on market prices. In
short, the question is one of Intent and effect. See Rohlfing, Carter, West,
and Harvey, Business and Government (1938) 140.
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that a state statute which is in contravention of federal anti-trust
legislation would be valid.
A second alternative is the action proposed by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, namely, an amendment
to the Sherman and Clayton Acts "excluding from the prohibitions
thereof all reasonable cooperative procedures necessary and in-
cidental to the establishment of statistical rate bases, rates, cov-
erages, and related matters.' 78 This suggests a procedure previ-
ously employed by Congress in the Miller-Tydings Amendment 79
to the Sherman Act whereby the practice of vertical price fixing
was excluded from the operation of the anti-trust law.
The model of the Miller-Tydings Amendment might be fur-
ther emulated by providing that cooperative practices will be
sanctioned under the federal act only to the extent that such
practices have been expressly authorized by state statutes. This
device will avoid federal intervention in opposition to state policy
and will call for the preparation of a model state statute, repeat-
ing the process which gave rise to the Fair Sales laws which'now
appear on the statute books of most states.8 0 The constitutional
status of such an amendment is now beyond question. 81 In event
that a legislative amendment of this nature were adopted, the
South-Eastern Underwriters case might well serve as a medium
of housecleaning with those states which may enact legislation
approving associations of companies. The proposal involves, in
effect, affirmative action by Congress buttressing state regulation.
Prior to the decision in the South-Eastern Underwriters case
legislation had been introduced in Congress to exclude completely
the business of insurance from the scope of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act and the Clayton Act. 2 Shortly after the Supreme
Court's action was announced, this bill was enacted by the
House.8 3 It is now resting on the table of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary. The result of final passage of this act would be,
of course, to lay the problem at rest insofar as present federal
anti-trust legislation is concerned. It is clear, however, that the
78. Report of Sub-Committee, supra note 68, at 9.
79. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. 1944).
80. The state fair trade acts are collected in Comment (1941) 3 LoUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 814, 817 et seq.
81. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S.
183, 57 S.Ct. 139, 81 L.Ed. 130 (1936). Cf. Dunn, Resale Price Maintenance
(1923) 32 Yale L.J. 676.
82. H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); S. 1362, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1943).
83. H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
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power of Congress to make later excursions into the field of in-
surance under the commerce clause remains established, and the
cloud which is cast upon the validity of state action is not dissi-
pated. The broadside attack of the proposed legislation represents
a more complete abnegation of federal control than was requested
by the Sub-Committee on Federal Legislation of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners,84 and there are some
murmurs of dissatisfaction among the brethren who would be
most affected thereby.
Significantly, even partial exemption by Congress of insur-
ance from the application of anti-trust statutes would leave insur-
ance companies 'subject to the Federal Trade Commission. Author-
ity is placed in that tribunal by the Clayton Act to enforce certain
sections of the statute. The Court's future determination whether
insurance contracts are, for example, "commodities," "wares," or
"merchandise" will decide if the Robinson-Patman Act extends
to insurance companies. 85 The present decision does not resolve
this issue but rather leaves it open for resolution at a later time.86
Moreover, the ruling as it stands now makes applicable the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.8" Methods and practices of insurance
companies may well fall within the scope of complaints brought
to the commission for redress of unfair or deceptive acts and
practices.8
Questions other than rate-making, statistical reporting, and
trade practices have been raised by the reversal of Paul v. Vir-
ginia. Thus, may a state now require a' foreign insurance company
engaged in interstate commerce to take out a license for the
84. See note 71, supra.
85. Thus Section 14 (Robinson-Patman Act) makes it illegal for any per-
son engaged in interstate commerce to effect a sale of goods, wares, or other
commodities on condition that the purchaser shall not deal in the goods of
a competitor when the effect of such a condition is to lessen competition
substantially. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 13, 21 (1941).
86. In one state case, Beechley v. Melville, 70 N.W. 107 (Iowa 1897), the
court held that "insurance" was a "commodity" within the meaning of an
Iowa statute. Reliance is placed largely on a dictionary definition of the term.
No other authorities are cited for conclusions.
87. 38,Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1941); 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15
U.S.C.A. § 13 (1941).
88. In this respect, by way of illustration, the following are Indicative:
Held unlawful by the Court to fix price levels and maintain boycott plans, to
make criticism and derogatory comments about a competitor, to make indis-
criminate and improper use of testimonials and statements without basis in
fact. Sears Roebuck v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307 (C.C.A. 7th,
1919); Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42
S.Ct. 150, 66 L.Ed. 307 (1922); Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Educa-
tional Society, 302 U.S. 112, 58 S.Ct. 113, 82 L.Ed. 141 (1937).
[Vol. VI
1944] INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE 45
privilege of carrying on its interstate business within the state? 9
May a state collect premium taxes from foreign insurance com-
panies? 90 These are, of course, but two of many preliminary prob-
lems raised by the present case. Not so significant as the problem
of rate determination, they yet demand an answer.
One point remains to be indicated briefly. Insofar as insur-
ance now comes within the scope of interstate commerce, state
regulatory acts are subject to judicial interpretation under the
commerce power in its oft shifting concepts. This may, or may
not, lead to what one insurance executive has termed "a sort of
statutory erosion" 91 which will eventually demand positive fed-
eral action. Certainly the history of the expansion of federal
regulatory activity under the commerce power indicates strongly
that when a business becomes huge in size and interstate in char-
acter, federal regulation is the ultimate result.92 Continued attacks
on the validity of state acts regulating insurance may well leave
the interstate insurance business in the same position railroads
not uncomfortably occupied in the period immediately following
the Wabash case.93 The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act
and the resultant creation of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion ensued to clarify the practices of a business truly interstate
in its scope and ramifications.
It has been suggested that Paul v. Virginia deprived the in-
surance industry of the distinction of being the first business sqb-
89. On this point the Court declared in Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S.
47, 58, 11 S. Ct. 851, 854, 35 L.Ed. 649, 652 (1891) that "a state law is unconsti-
tutional and void which requires a party to take out a license for interstate
commerce, no matter how specious the pretext for imposing it."
90. Compare Binderup v. Path6 Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 308-310, 44 S.Ct.
96, 100, 68 L.Ed. 308, 316 (1923) with Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363, 364,
63 S.Ct. 307, 319, 320, 87 L.Ed. 315, 332 (1943).
91. McFall, Memorandum, supra note 70, at 11.
92. A list of federally regulated industries with dates of passage of
regulatory acts follows:
Railroads February 4, 1887
Oil Pipe Lines June 29, 1906
Express Companies June 29, 1906
Telegraph Companies June 18, 1910
Telephone Companies June 18, 1910
Water Carriers (foreign commerce) February 28, 1920
Air Commerce May 20, 1926
Securities May 27, 1933
Motor Carriers August 9, 1935
Electric Power August 26, 1935
Natural Gas June 21, 1938
Civil Aeronautics June 23, 1938
Water Carriers September 18, 1940
93. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific R.R. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 7 S.Ct. 4,
30 L.Ed. 244 (1886).
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jected to an independent federal regulatory body. 4 If, under the
South-Eastern Underwriters decision, states are no longer able
to regulate the conditions apparently required for the conduct of
the business with or without federal assistance, the time has come
for their departure from the field. Nor need it be mourned un-
duly. Granting fully that initial dislocations of practices may be
severe, that-a federal supervisory system cannot be devised in a
day, the ultimate effect of the Court's judgment in United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association will be to force Con-
gress's hand to the end that one more phase of political and legal
existence be integrated with the realities of economic life.
94. Cushman, The Problem of Independent Regulatory Commissions(1937) Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Manage-
ment 27.
